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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

MEDICAID’S NEXT FIFTY YEARS:
ALIGNING AN OLD PROGRAM WITH THE NEW NORMAL
SARA ROSENBAUM*
I. INTRODUCTION
The largest of all means-tested entitlement programs and a long-term
survivor of battles over spending and ideology, Medicaid was significantly
transformed by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).1 But
further reforms are needed if Medicaid is to emerge as what Chief Justice
John Roberts in NFIB v. Sebelius characterized as “an element of a
comprehensive national plan to provide universal health insurance
coverage.”2 Medicaid figured prominently in the Court’s decision; the
ruling, which barred the Secretary from fully enforcing the terms of the
mandatory expansion,3 can be expected to have a significant impact on the
rate and scope of state implementation of the Medicaid reforms. Even so,
most observers expect states ultimately to implement the expansion,
reasoning that the enormous need for insurance coverage for the poor,
coupled with the Act’s financial advantages, will lead states to move
forward.4 As they do, one would expect that the wheels of legislative

* J.D., Harold and Jane Hirsh Professor, Health Law and Policy, George Washington
University School of Public Health and Health Services. I am extremely grateful to my research
assistant, Michal McDowell, for her research help.
1. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 36B(b)(3)(A)(i), (b)(2) (2011); Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 2001, 1413, 124 Stat. 119, 233, 271 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 18083, 1396a(e) (2011)) [hereinafter ACA].
2. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606 (2012) [hereinafter
NFIB].
3. For a comprehensive discussion of the ruling, see Nicole Huberfield et al., Plunging
Into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in the Healthcare Cases (B.U. Sch. of Law,
Working Paper No. 12-40, 2012), available at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/
workingpapers/2012.html; see also Samuel Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the
Spending Clause After NFIB (Geo. L.J. Research Paper No. 286, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2128977.
4. By mid-February 2013, officials in 18 states had indicated that they were definitely not
participating or leaning in that direction. The remaining states were either in the process of
adoption, leaning toward adoption, or undecided. Where States Stand on the Medicaid
Expansion, THE ADVISORY BOARD (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.advisory.com/Daily-Brief
ing/2012/11/09/MedicaidMap#lightbox/1/. Indeed, several Republican governors who
329
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innovation would continue to turn, as they have for decades, in order to
produce the next generation of legislative amendments essential to
retrofitting an established program to a new order. But the question that
now confronts Medicaid is whether the reform process will be business as
usual or whether a poisonous political environment will impede this effort to
assure that Medicaid indeed is able to more successfully play an expanded
role in the American health system.
Continuing the work of re-designing Medicaid is essential for two
reasons. First, the success of the ACA’s insurance reforms hinges on the new
system’s ability to enroll millions of previously uninsured young, healthy
working-age adults and their families. Today this population is strikingly
poor: more than one-third of all Americans live in families with incomes
below twice the federal poverty level,5 and it is this group that lacks health
insurance coverage.6 Thus, a large proportion of the newly insured will
require subsidies if coverage is to be affordable. Because Congress chose to
design a subsidy coverage system that spans two distinct markets (Medicaid
and state health insurance Exchanges),7 assuring their harmonious
functioning becomes central to the success of health reform. This aim
assumes special importance for younger, healthier people, whose tolerance
for frequent coverage lapses and loss of access to network physicians may
be minimal.
Second, additional reforms are needed in order to align Medicaid’s new
mission to insure virtually all poor U.S. residents8 with other program
initially had strongly opposed the Medicaid expansion were moving toward its embrace. Paul
West, Medicaid Expansion Divides GOP Governors, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2013), http://articles.
latimes.com/2013/feb/07/nation/la-na-medicaid-20130208/2.
5. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011, at 18 tbl.5 (2012), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p60-243.pdf.
6. In 2011, more than three-quarters of uninsured Americans had family incomes below
250% of the federal poverty level. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE UNINSURED AND THE DIFFERENCE
HEALTH INSURANCE MAKES 2 fig.3 (2012), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/14
20-14.pdf.
7. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EXPLAINING HEALTH REFORM: ELIGIBILITY AND ENROLLMENT
PROCESSES FOR MEDICAID, CHIP, AND SUBSIDIES IN THE EXCHANGES 1 (2010), available at
http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8090.pdf.
8. Medicaid excludes coverage of otherwise eligible persons not lawfully present in the
United States. Medicaid eligibility for non-citizens is linked to their immigration status, and the
law imposes a five-year waiting period on eligibility for legal U.S. residents. See ALLISON
SISKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TREATMENT OF NONCITIZENS UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION
AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 7 (2011), available at http://www.nafsa.org/uploadedFiles/CRS%
20analysis%20re%20noncitizens.pdf. Legal residents are covered by the Act’s minimum
coverage requirements and entitled to use state Exchanges. They may obtain subsidized
coverage through health insurance Exchanges as well as tax subsidies during their five-year
waiting period for Medicaid coverage. Persons not lawfully present in the U.S. are excluded
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responsibilities. The first responsibility is to finance healthcare for millions of
children and adults with disabilities, for whom conventional health insurance
(even if they have it) is not sufficient. The ACA bars pre-existing condition
exclusions9 and annual and lifetime dollar limits on most covered care;10 the
law also imposes annual limits on families’ out-of-pocket cost exposure.11
But these reforms offer inadequate protection for conditions that require
treatments that lie beyond the outer limits of the commercial insurance
coverage design that is the ACA’s hallmark in the new insurance market.
Historically, Medicaid has played the dominant role in long-term care, not
only as a primary insurer, but also as a supplemental insurer for individuals
with primary coverage through Medicare or employer-sponsored plans.12
Aligning Medicaid’s historic role in financing care for people with disabilities
represents a major challenge left shockingly unaddressed by the ACA, with
potentially dangerous results.
The second responsibility is support for the healthcare safety net; indeed,
Medicaid has long served as the economic base on which the safety net
rests.13 The safety net is complex, comprised of healthcare institutions with a

from the minimum coverage requirement, I.R.C. § 5000A(d)(3) (2011), and also are excluded
from purchasing health insurance coverage through state Exchanges. ACA § 1312(f)(3)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18032 (2011)). Of the nation’s 21.6 million non-citizens,
approximately 11.2 million are estimated to be not lawfully present. SISKIN, supra, at 2-3.
Compared to the general population, undocumented persons are far more likely to be
uninsured (47% compared to 15%). KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SUMMARY: FIVE BASIC FACTS ON
IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR HEALTH CARE (2008), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/
7761.pdf.
9. ACA § 1201 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3 (2011)).
10. ACA § 1001 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11 (2011)). The bar on annual and
lifetime dollar limits applies only to benefits and services falling within the Act’s essential health
benefit categories. Id. § 1302 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2011)).
11. ACA § 1201 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (2011)).
12. KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID FACTS, MEDICAID AND LONG-TERM CARE SERVICES AND
SUPPORTS 1 (2009), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/2186_06.pdf; KAISER
FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE CHARTBOOK, SECTION SIX: SUPPLEMENTAL INSURANCE COVERAGE 58
(4th ed. 2010).
13. Medicaid accounts for 35% of public hospitals’ net revenue and 37% of health center
funding. See NAT’L ASS’N OF PUBLIC HOSPITALS AND HEALTH SYSTEMS, IN UNCERTAIN TIMES,
SAFETY NET HOSPITALS MAINTAIN COMMITMENT TO SERVE 2 fig.2 (2012), available at
http://www.naph.org/Main-Menu-Category/Publications/Safety-Net-Financing/FY2010- Char
acteristics-Report-Summary.aspx?FT=.pdf; see generally PETER SHIN ET AL., KAISER FAMILIY
FOUND., HEALTH CENTERS: AN OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THEIR EXPERIENCES WITH PRIVATE
HEALTH INSURANCE (2008), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7738.pdf; SHIN
ET AL., GEO. WASH. U. SCH. PUB. HEALTH & HEALTH SERVS., AN INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS
OF MEDICAID DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS ON HEALTH CENTERS AND THEIR PATIENTS 6
(2007), available at http://sphhs.gwu.edu/departments/healthpolicy/CHPR/downloads/Medi
caid_Doc_Requirements.pdf.
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tradition of serving poor and vulnerable patients, as well as entities such as
public hospitals and federally funded community health centers14 that by law
must furnish care to all residents of their service areas15 and that are
protected under Medicaid through special payment rules.16
The safety net’s role will likely only intensify in the wake of reform.17 Even
at full implementation, 27 million people will remain uninsured,18 and the
remaining uninsured can be expected increasingly to shift into safety net
settings.19 Furthermore, persons newly insured under Medicaid will be more
likely to reside in medically underserved communities characterized by
elevated poverty and health risks and reduced access to care, because of
the strong association between low income and lack of health insurance.20
Additionally, millions of lower income safety net patients who gain coverage
will nonetheless continue to face significant cost-sharing obligations both for
covered benefits (subsidized health insurance plans sold through Exchanges
will have only a 70% actuarial value,21 and cost sharing reduction
assistance is available but by no means complete) and for uncovered costs
such as adult dental care. The safety net can be expected to absorb the
immediate surge in healthcare use following full implementation.

14. For a general discussion of community health centers and the Affordable Care Act,
see Eli Adashi et al., Health Care Reform and Primary Care – The Growing Importance of the
Community Health Center, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2047 (2010).
15. For a general discussion of the healthcare safety net, see INST. OF MED., THE HEALTH
CARE SAFETY NET: INTACT BUT ENDANGERED (2000). For a discussion of how the ACA affects
safety net institutions and providers, see Mark Hall & Sara Rosenbaum, The Health Care Safety
Net in the Context of National Health Insurance Reform, in THE HEALTH CARE SAFETY NET IN A
POST-REFORM WORLD (Mark Hall & Sara Rosenbaum eds., 2012) [hereinafter SAFETY NET].
16. Rosenbaum, Reinventing a Classic: Community Health Centers and the Newly
Insured, in SAFETY NET, supra note 15, at 76-77.
17. Id. at 76.
18. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE AND JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, UPDATED ESTIMATES FOR THE
INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 12 tbl.3 (2012), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/03-13-Coverage%20Esti
mates.pdf.
19. This is precisely what happened in Massachusetts in the wake of that state’s health
reform effort; following passage, health centers served an even higher proportion of the state’s
remaining uninsured population. Leighton Ku et al., Safety Net Providers After Health Reform:
Lessons from Massachusetts, 171 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1379, 1382-83 (2011).
20. ROSENBAUM ET AL., GEO. WASH. U. SCH. PUB. HEALTH & HEALTH SERVS., NATIONAL
HEALTH REFORM: HOW WILL MEDICALLY UNDERSERVED COMMUNITIES FARE? 10-11 (2009),
available at http://sphhs.gwu.edu/departments/healthpolicy/dhp_publications/pub_uploads/
dhpPublication_5046C2DE-5056-9D20-3D2A570F2CF3F8B0.pdf.
21. The silver plan, the standard health plan linked to premium tax credits in health
insurance Exchanges, is pegged to 70% of the full actuarial value of benefit. ACA §
1302(d)(1)(B) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2011)); id. § 1401 (codified at I.R.C. § 36
(2011)).
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A third responsibility is improving health care for the poor. Continuity is
a holy grail of healthcare quality improvement, one on which deeper health
system improvements largely depend. Now that Congress has chosen to
create two separate markets for subsidized coverage, the task becomes
market alignment in ways that enable more stable coverage, foster longer
term relationships between patients and providers, and reduce the potential
for gaming in a system that, driven by market forces, may be incentivized to
skimp on care, secure in the knowledge that in a matter of months, patients
will disappear. Medicaid offers rich and extensive coverage. It is unique in
that respect and has proved capable of achieving important health and
healthcare outcomes for the poor.22 Now the goal is its greater integration
in to a broader, subsidized market for health care.
The article examines Medicaid in the wake of the ACA and prospects for
further reform given the political environment that now envelopes it.
II. THE ACA AND MEDICAID’S FIVE ALIGNMENT CHALLENGES
A.

Context

Uninsured people are the chief immediate beneficiaries of the sweeping
reforms made by the ACA. But being uninsured is not a static event, and
even before passage of the Act, churning in and out of coverage was a welldocumented problem,23 with over 40% of Medicaid-insured adults losing
coverage within a year.24 The problem of coverage churn will persist in the
wake of the ACA; its potential magnitude was captured in a 2011 study25
that simulated the coverage experience of adults with incomes below twice
the federal poverty level at the point of full implementation of the Affordable
Care Act. The study found that within 6 months, over 35% of American
adults with incomes below twice the federal poverty level can be expected to
experience a change in income that will shift them from Medicaid (where
eligibility ends at 133% of the federal poverty level) to coverage through a

22. Many studies have shown Medicaid’s impact on the health of the poor. See, e.g.,
KAREN DAVIS & CATHY SCHOEN, HEALTH AND THE WAR ON POVERTY: A TEN-YEAR APPRAISAL (The
Brookings Inst. ed., 1978) (discussing the reduction in infant mortality and benefits to the poor
credited to Medicaid); Benjamin D. Sommers et al., Mortality and Access to Care Among
Adults After State Medicaid Expansions, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED 1025 (2012) (showing that
Medicaid has been shown to achieve important health outcomes for its beneficiaries).
23. See, e.g., Pam Farley Short & Deborah R. Graefe, Battery-Powered Health Insurance?
Stability in Coverage of the Uninsured, HEALTH AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2003, at 244.
24. Benjamin D. Sommers, Loss of Health Insurance Among Non-elderly Adults in
Medicaid, 24 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1, 2 (2009).
25. Benjamin D. Sommers & Sara Rosenbaum, Issues in Health Reform: How Changes in
Eligibility May Move Millions Back and Forth Between Medicaid and Insurance Exchanges, 30
HEALTH AFF. 228, 232 (2011).
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state health insurance Exchange, or the reverse. Within one year, 50% —
28 million adults — will experience a shift in one direction or the other.
Even more striking, 24% of this group will have experienced 2 or more
changes in one year; over a two-year period, the number experiencing two
or more changes rises to 39%. More than 40% of these adults are estimated
to have children under age 19, meaning that the problem will affect both
millions of children and adults.
The adverse ramifications of churn are great, not only for the families
that experience the effects of churn — interrupted coverage, plan switching
between two markets, and breaks in the continuity of treatment from a
regular provider — but also for the broader goal of affordability. The
estimated 56 million low income adults and 35 million children who will
experience post-reform churn across the Medicaid and Exchange markets26
represent the healthiest risk groups across the two markets. Unlike the
millions of older and sicker adults who gain enormous benefits from health
reform, this group is in the workforce and in relatively good health. The
cause of their cross-market churn is, of course, income fluctuation, which is
more likely to occur in working families than in adults who are in poorer
health and living on fixed incomes.27 For these families, income fluctuates as
younger workers enter and leave the job market, add or drop hours of
employment, or have children, thereby increasing family size in relation to
total household income, which in turn triggers an effective decline in family
income in relation to the federal poverty level.
B.

Specific Challenges

Addressing the problem of constant churning across two distinct
insurance markets requires multiple types of market alignment. Entry into the
system needs to be conceptualized as a single point of entry, where people
can be linked to the proper subsidy source both initially and as
circumstances change. Enrollment must be stable so that re-evaluation of
financial eligibility for subsidies need happen only periodically, in the
manner of an annual enrollment period. Benefits and cost sharing need to
be aligned so that members become accustomed to what is and is not
covered. The same health plans using the same delivery networks should be
sold in the two markets so that in the event that the source of subsidy needs
to change as a result of fluctuation in real or effective income, plan
membership and provider continuity will remain stable. Under this scenario,
fluctuating income would entail a transactional shift in subsidy source, but
no shift in coverage or care.

26. Id. at 232.
27. Id. at 229.
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The question is whether the Medicaid reforms introduced under the Act
are sufficient to get the system to this point, even assuming that states fully
implement the Medicaid expansion in the wake of NFIB and that states
implement choices that are consistent with this vision of market alignment.
Unfortunately, the ACA Medicaid amendments fall short in a number of key
respects, as do the provisions establishing state Exchanges. Furthermore,
early implementation of the Act by the United States Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) suggests a willingness to tolerate state
implementation choices that are at odds with market alignment. Finally, the
Act entirely fails to recognize a crucial issue related to Medicaid’s
longstanding role as a source of supplemental health insurance for children
and adults with disabilities.
1. Aligning Enrollment
The ACA creates two distinct subsidized health insurance markets:
Medicaid for the poorest people; and premium subsidies and cost sharing
reduction assistance offered through state Exchanges for persons whose
incomes fall below the upper limits for this type of affordability assistance,28
but are too high to qualify for Medicaid.29 Eligibility for premium subsidies is
linked to coverage months,30 and assistance is barred for any month that an
individual is eligible for another form of “minimum essential coverage,”31
which includes Medicaid.32 The extraordinary degree to which, in an effort
to avert a “crowd-out” effect,33 Exchange premium subsidies must be
exclusively focused on those without another form of coverage means that in
a fluctuating income environment, enrollment and income evaluation
functions between state Exchanges and Medicaid agencies must be
exquisitely and continually aligned. To this end, the Act requires state
Exchanges to screen all applicants for potential Medicaid eligibility and to
“enroll such individuals in” Medicaid if their “modified adjusted gross

28. I.R.C. § 36B(b)(3)(A)(i) (2011). The range is from 133% of the federal poverty level to
400% of the federal poverty level.
29. Id. § 36.
30. Id. § 36B(b)(2).
31. Id. §§ 36B(b)(2), 36B(c)(2)(B), 5000A(f)(1)(C).
32. Id. § 5000A(f)(1)(A)(ii).
33. The extent to which concerns over government-supported health insurance “crowds
out” private sector coverage has been a major, if misplaced, concern in U.S. health reform
policy for decades. For an important critique, see Mark Schlesinger, Crowding Out: Multiple
Manifestations, Muddled Meanings, 37 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 851 (2012) (arguing that the
concept has deterred government interventions aimed at correcting failures in the health
insurance market).
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income” (MAGI)34 places them within the Medicaid eligibility range.35 The
Act further requires Medicaid agencies to undertake a series of steps aimed
at simplifying the Medicaid enrollment and redetermination process itself36
and to assure that individuals who apply for coverage through an Exchange
and who are found eligible for Medicaid because their income is too low
will be “enrolled” in Medicaid.37
Total alignment of enrollment functions certainly does not cure the
problem of having to effectively re-evaluate income on a monthly basis. But
it certainly helps. However, an already significant problem was worsened by
an implementation choice made by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS), which administers both the ACA’s Medicaid and Exchange
provisions. Despite the ACA’s clarity on the issue of alignment through
enrollment and re-enrollment, final CMS regulations permit Exchanges to
stop at the point of eligibility determination and redetermination and simply
transfer files to Medicaid agencies for final determinations and enrollment.38
The abandonment of alignment through a unified enrollment process is the
gift that will keep on giving, since, as the evidence shows, the process of
losing and gaining income is a dynamic one that can take place multiple
times throughout a given year. The absence of a single portal for
enrollment, regardless of the source of premium subsidy, virtually ensures
breaks in coverage, as the subsidy basis continually changes. This
phenomenon is evident even in Massachusetts, where, years after reform,
lower income adults continue to experience frequent breaks in coverage.39
Two changes might ease this problem. The first is requiring states to
fulfill their system integration responsibilities by a set date and barring
separate enrollment procedures. In states utilizing federally administered
Exchanges (and the fact that only 13 states and the District of Columbia had
enacted Exchange laws as of May 2012 suggests that many will do so),40

34. The Act establishes a “modified adjusted gross income” methodology for evaluating
income for purposes of both Medicaid and Exchange affordability assistance. ACA § 2002
(amending 42 U.S.C. §1396a(e)(14) (2011)).
35. Id. § 1311(d)(4)(F) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2011)).
36. Id. § 1413 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18083 (2011)).
37. Id. § 1413(a).
38. 42 C.F.R. §§ 155.305(b), 155.310(d)(3) (2012).
39. John A. Graves and Katherine Schwartz, Health Care Reform and the Dynamics of
Insurance Coverage – Lessons from Massachusetts, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1181, 1183
(2012).
40. SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, STATE HEALTH INSURANCE
EXCHANGE LAWS: THE FIRST GENERATION 1 (2012), available at http://www.commonwealth
fund.org/Publications/Issue-Briefs/2012/Jul/State-Health-Insurance-Exchange-Laws/aspx.
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such a change would require federal legislation, since by law, only a state
Medicaid agency can determine eligibility for Medicaid.41
But even if greater alignment were to happen, either through state
computerized integration of the Medicaid/premium subsidy enrollment
function or through a federal law permitting federally administered
Exchanges to directly enroll Medicaid-eligible persons in Medicaid,42 the
problem of income fluctuation as a result of a continual flow of life events
means that the concept of measuring subsidy sources in relation to
“coverage months” seems hopelessly inefficient. Informing government of
changes in income, family size, and other matters that might affect eligibility
will become an all-consuming event. Prior to the ACA, states had the
flexibility to ignore minor income fluctuations43 (although virtually none did
so); in the wake of passage, however, this flexibility is eliminated in favor of
a unified MAGI test, which eliminates states’ power to disregard income
fluctuations.44
Where cash welfare is concerned, there might be some limited
justification for such a month-to-month approach to government assistance.
Where the goal is to stabilize health care, the process is absurd on its face.
Far more desirable would be legislation to establish annual enrollment
periods with an uninterrupted entitlement to a subsidy source throughout the
enrollment period. Obviously during periods in which the subsidy is taxbased, the federal government would absorb 100% of the costs, with states
sharing the cost (after 2016 in the case of newly eligible persons and
beginning in 2014 in the case of traditional eligibility groups, for whom the
federal financial contribution remains at pre-ACA levels) in the case of
Medicaid. Both the federal and state partners would want the other to bear
as much cost exposure as possible. But life being what it is, over a severalyear time period, the economics of annual enrollment periods would
essentially be a wash.
2. Aligning Eligibility Policy for Persons with Disabilities
Medicaid plays two basic roles as an insurer. The first is as a primary
insurer for millions of children and adults who have no other source of
coverage, either through the employer system or any other insuring

41. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (2011).
42. Whether a federal amendment commanding states to accept as eligible individuals
determined eligible for Medicaid by a federal exchange could succeed politically is another
matter.
43. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (2011) (requiring states to set reasonable
standards for determining income); 42 C.F.R. § 435.916 (2012) (permitting states to establish
annual eligibility periods).
44. ACA § 2002 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §1396a(e) (2011)).
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mechanism. The second is as a supplemental insurer, both for Medicare
beneficiaries45 as well as for individuals who may have other forms of
coverage, such as employer-sponsored benefits and for whom their primary
coverage is inadequate. Medicaid’s role as a secondary payer dates back to
the program’s 1965 enactment.46 Indeed, the ACA strengthens Medicaid’s
potential role as a secondary payer by requiring states, as a condition of
participation, to finance premium assistance as a part of Medicaid
coverage, thereby potentially expanding Medicaid’s role as a dual insurer.47
In this respect, Medicaid’s role as a supplemental source of coverage
predates the policy shift toward exclusivity of coverage under governmental
insurance programs, a shift that occurred in response to concerns over the
claimed potential of public payers to “crowd-out” the private market.48
Medicaid’s role as a supplemental insurer for persons with disabilities
remains central to the program’s role in the healthcare system, particularly
in relation to the limitations of commercial insurance, whose design serves
as the benchmark for the new subsidized Exchange market. Even though the
ACA bars exclusion and discrimination on the basis of disability at the point
of enrollment, the Act bakes discriminatory insurer practices into coverage
design in several ways. The frame of reference for the essential health
benefit (EHB) package49 that lies at the heart of Exchange plans is the
“typical” employer market.50 Although the ACA bars the Secretary from
introducing benefit designs in essential health benefits that discriminate on
the basis of disability,51 she has, in fact, ceded her authority over benefit
design to states, who determine the design of their essential health benefit
packages from among their employer-sponsored group markets.52

45. Approximately 9.1 million Medicare beneficiaries also were enrolled in Medicaid in
FY 2008 for either partial or full coverage. KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED,
MEDICAID’S ROLE FOR DUAL ELIGIBLE BENEFICIARIES 1 (2012), available at http://www.kff.org/
medicaid/upload/7846-03.pdf.
46. 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(25) (2011); see also COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, MEDICAID 1
(2003), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/greenbook2003/medi
caid.pdf.
47. ACA § 2003 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396e-1 (2011)).
48. See Schlesinger, supra note 33, at 854, 860.
49. ACA § 1302 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2011)).
50. Id. § 1302(b)(2)(A).
51. Id. § 1302(b)(4)(B). For a discussion of the non-discrimination in benefit design
provision, see Sara Rosenbaum et al., Crossing the Rubicon: The Impact of the Affordable
Care Act on the Content of Insurance Coverage for Persons with Disabilities, 25 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 527, 555 (2011).
52. CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS BULLETIN 2, 8
(2011), available at http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/Files2/12162011/essential_health_
benefits_bulletin.pdf.
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Other than extension of mental health parity to Exchange plans,53 as of
spring 2013, there is no final federal policy on how states must broadly
adjust benefit design to counter discrimination in coverage on the basis of
disability.54 As a result, federal implementing standards do not override the
limitations and exclusions commonly used to narrow coverage for persons
with disabilities, such as medical necessity limitations that exclude coverage
for which “normal” functioning cannot be restored, or exclusions that bar
coverage for treatments considered “social” or “educational.”55 These types
of limitations have no counterpart in Medicaid, which bars arbitrary
limitations based on condition56 and which provides uncommonly broad
coverage of children under 21 through the early and periodic screening
diagnosis and treatment benefit (EPSDT).57As such, Medicaid is particularly
effective in coverage of supplemental long-term services and supports such
as the services of personal attendants, additional levels of prescription drug
coverage beyond that found in a typical employer plan, and additional
treatments and services for conditions that require ongoing interventions. In
other words, through its expansive coverage and third party liability
provisions, Medicaid is designed to work alongside other forms of coverage.
This has been particularly important for working families with disabled
children, as well as for disabled adults who return to work and who, under
expanded Medicaid eligibility policies, are permitted to retain Medicaid even
while they have primary coverage through an employer.
However, rather than permitting Medicaid to play a supplemental role
for persons with Exchange coverage, the ACA follows the exclusivity rule and
introduces anti-crowd-out restrictions into the law by barring Exchange
premium subsidies in any coverage month in which individuals are entitled
to Medicaid coverage. This means that low and moderate income
individuals and families entitled to Medicaid on the basis of disability are

53. ACA § 1311(j) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2011)).
54. Proposed regulations issued on November 26, 2012 and governing essential health
benefits bar plan designs that discriminate on the basis of disability but offer no illustration of
what such discrimination might look like. 77 Fed. Reg. 70644 (proposed Nov. 26, 2012) (to
be codified at 45 C.F.R. §156.125).
55. See, e.g., SARA ROSENBAUM, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, O’ NEILL INST., INSURANCE
DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF HEALTH STATUS 6-7 (2009), available at http://scholarship.
law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1023&context=ois_papers (discussing types
of exclusions which limit coverage for treatment); see also Mary Crossley, Discrimination
Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 73, 95 (2005) (discussing
federal ADA interpretation which limits protection for persons with disabilities).
56. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c) (2012).
57. For a full discussion of the EPSDT benefit in relation to commercial insurance norms,
see Sara Rosenbaum & Paul Wise, Crossing the Medicaid-Private Insurance Divide: The Case
of EPSDT, 26 HEALTH AFF. 382 (2007).
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ineligible to simultaneously receive premium subsidies for Exchange
coverage. It also means that states are confronted with a basic choice:
either continue higher Medicaid eligibility levels for children and adults with
disabilities as permitted under law and forego the financial offsets that
would accrue from their receipt of primary coverage through Exchanges; or
eliminate more generous Medicaid eligibility standards for disabled children
and adults in order to qualify them for fully federally funded Exchange
subsidies. Furthermore, if, in response to the Medicaid expansion turmoil
introduced into the picture by the Supreme Court’s Medicaid holding in
NFIB, the Administration were to permit states to partially implement the
Act’s Medicaid expansion provision — say, up to only 100% of the poverty
line, which in turn triggers entitlement to Exchange premium subsidies under
the ACA58 — the termination point for Medicaid eligibility for persons with
disabilities could sink even lower. An HHS ruling issued on December 10,
2012 in fact rejected a partial Medicaid expansion pathway as not
authorized under the Act.59 It appears therefore, that the potential for a
rollback of disability-based Medicaid eligibility is limited to beneficiaries with
family incomes exceeding the Exchange eligibility threshold.
One solution to this dilemma would require modification of both
Medicaid and the ACA’s premium assistance and Exchange provisions to
permit states to continue to furnish Medicaid based on disability to low and
moderate income persons whose simultaneous entitlement to medical
assistance otherwise would be barred by the Act’s anti-crowd-out provisions.
In addition, amendments eliminating the anti-crowd-out provisions of the
ACA in the case of disability would be paired with amendments that provide
enhanced levels of federal funding to states that either retain or establish
more generous Medicaid eligibility standards based on disability in order to
supplement Exchange coverage.
It is too soon to tell, of course, what states will do. But the betting is on a
massive Medicaid eligibility rollback of enhanced coverage based on
disability in order to qualify persons with incomes above the Exchange
threshold (wherever it might ultimately be set) for premium subsidies. In its
current form, the Act simply provides no incentive for states to maintain
higher Medicaid eligibility levels for persons with disabilities, nor does it
58. See Sara Rosenbaum & Timothy Westmoreland, The Supreme Court’s Surprising
Decision On The Medicaid Expansion: How Will The Federal Government And States
Proceed?, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1663, 1668-69 (2012).
59. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON
EXCHANGES, MARKET REFORMS, AND MEDICAID 12 (Dec. 10, 2012), available at
http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/exchanges-faqs-12-10-2012.pdf; Sara Rosenbaum &
Timothy Westmoreland, The Administration’s Decision on Partial Medicaid Implementation:
True to the Law, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (December 19, 2012), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/
12/19/the-administrations-decision-on-partial-medicaid-implementation-true-to-the-law/.
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even allow states to do so. Indeed, the incentives appear to move state
Medicaid policy in precisely the opposite direction, while denying persons
with disabilities in more generous Medicaid states the ability to secure
primary coverage through a qualified health plan offered through their state
Exchange, a fundamental disability-based distinction if there ever were one.
3. Aligning Coverage Design
As noted, the ACA utilizes the EHB coverage design model for Exchange
products. The ACA also grafts the EHB design onto the Medicaid coverage
standards in the case of the newly eligible adult population.60 Prior to the
ACA’s passage, states already had been given the option under the Deficit
Reduction Act of 200561 to move to a more commercially-oriented
“benchmark” benefit design in the case of certain low income adult and
child populations. But the benchmark option excluded, among other
beneficiary populations, parents receiving Temporary Aid to Needy Families
(TANF) benefits and those who would have to continue to meet their states’
1996 Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) eligibility
standards.62 Thus, where the adult population was concerned, the 2006
benchmark option applied only to small groups of low income adults.63
The ACA replaces the 2006 benchmark coverage standard with the
more rigorous EHB coverage design.64 The ACA also preserves the state
option to supplement commercial benchmark coverage with additional
benefits, such as vision and dental care, that represent coverage options for
adults.65 Finally, the ACA retains the earlier benchmark coverage provision
that requires states to supplement benchmark coverage in the case of
individuals under age 21 with full Medicaid coverage for all EPSDT
benefits.66
The ACA amendments create an anomalous situation. On the one
hand, newly eligible low income adults receive EHB-level benchmark

60. ACA § 2001(c) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(b) (2011)).
61. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 6044, 120 Stat. 4, 88-92
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7 (2006)).
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(a)(2) (2011) (listing the excluded Medicaid beneficiary
categories).
63. In effect, the only adults whose coverage could be subject to the benchmark standard
would be certain narrow optional coverage groups such as 18-21 year olds who remained
eligible for coverage under their state plan, optional pregnant women, and optional low
income parents.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(b) (2011).
65. Id. § 1396u-7(a)(1)(C).
66. Id. § 1396u-7(a)(1)(A)(ii). For a discussion of the EPSDT benefit, which has a storied
history and has been the subject of extensive litigation, see Rosenbaum & Wise, supra note
57.
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coverage, including comprehensive preventive services without cost sharing,
a wide array of other coverage classes, and full mental health parity. On the
other hand, the poorest adult populations (those eligible for TANF or poor
enough to still qualify for cash assistance under their state’s 1996 AFDC
program) receive traditional benefits that do not treat preventive care as a
coverage requirement and that lack a mental health parity protection with
the exception of beneficiaries enrolled in certain managed care
arrangements.67 Arguably the EHB benefit design actually is superior to
Medicaid’s traditional coverage design where low income adults are
concerned, and yet the poorest adults are barred from receiving this level of
coverage and remain consigned to Medicaid’s traditional coverage design.
One solution would be to allow states to move all low income adults
into the EHB benefit design. As previously discussed, such a move would
result in certain limitations in coverage for low income adults that previously
were barred under traditional Medicaid coverage rules, such as the
prohibition against arbitrary discrimination on the basis of condition in the
case of required services.68 This prohibition, as noted, historically has
prevented states from adopting certain commercial insurance practices,
such as excluding certain conditions from coverage or denying treatments to
patients whose conditions require treatments to avert further loss of
functioning rather than restore “normal function.” But, as also noted, this
prohibition against arbitrary coverage rules is at least partially met through
the mental health parity requirements that become applicable to EHB
coverage arrangements under the ACA. Furthermore, because EHB design
encompasses not only rehabilitative services but also those that are
habilitative in nature, the EHB design limits the degree to which otherwise
covered treatments can be excluded because they are prescribed in order to
develop or maintain functioning rather than to restore the loss of prior
function, a routine form of discrimination found in standard commercial
plans.
Allowing states to move to the EHB design also would eliminate
coverage requirements for certain services directly tied to support of the
healthcare safety net, in particular, Medicaid’s “federally qualified health
center service” (FQHC) benefit,69 which treats the services of community
health centers as an actual coverage category, not simply a locus of care. At

67. See Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir. of Ctr. for Medicaid and State Operations, to State
Health Officials 2 (Nov. 4, 2009), available at http://downloads.cms.gov/cmsgov/archiveddownloads/SMDL/downloads/SHO110409.pdf (providing an explanation of how mental
health parity affects managed care arrangements).
68. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text (regarding the interaction of Medicaid
coverage standards and disability).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(2)(C) (2011).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2013]

MEDICAID’S NEXT FIFTY YEARS

343

the same time, quite apart from the FQHC benefit mandate, federal
Medicaid law also requires states to pay health centers at special enhanced
rates for the covered benefits and services they furnish, thereby protecting
them from a steep revenue loss for covered services. The FQHC payment
rule, which is separate from the coverage rule, spans multiple healthcare
delivery arrangements: qualified health plans sold in health insurance
Exchanges;70 Medicaid managed care arrangements;71 health plans sold
through the Children’s Health Insurance Program;72 and Medicaid’s basic
fee-for-service system.73 Thus, even were the FQHC coverage requirement
to be eliminated, Medicaid’s special payment standard for covered benefits
would remain in place, as would Medicaid’s special payment rules for
hospitals treating a disproportionate number of low income patients (DSH
payments).74
4. Aligning Coverage Products
Federal Medicaid law provides for program administration, at state
option, through managed care arrangements. Three-quarters of all

70. ACA § 10104 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2011)).
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396u-7(b)(4), 1396u-2(h)(2)(C) (2011).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1397gg(e)(1)(G) (2011).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(bb) (2011).
74. The fact that revising coverage rules under Medicaid would not alter safety net
payment standards is only part of the story, however. The ACA imposes specific reductions on
Medicare DSH hospital payments as well as states’ Medicaid DSH allocations, which are fixed
and subject to annual global limits as a result of amendments enacted to Medicaid in 1991
aimed at halting what was characterized as an abuse of the Medicaid DSH payment system.
MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT AND ACCESS COMM. (MACPAC), MARCH 2012 REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON MEDICAID AND CHIP 181 (2012), available at http://www.modernhealthcare.
com/Assets/pdf/CH78650315.PDF. For a history of federal Medicaid DSH payment reforms,
see id. at ch. 3. The ACA’s DSH payment reductions were criticized prior to NFIB because of
their overly optimistic assumption about the extent to which the Act’s Medicaid eligibility
expansions would reduce the need for supplemental funding for DSH hospitals; the ACA DSH
amendments also were criticized for the degree to which the ACA continued to allow states
latitude in how they target DSH payments. With the pace of the Medicaid expansion now
thrown into uncertainty as a result of the Court’s decision, the potential adverse implications of
the ACA’s DSH payment cuts looms larger. For an overview of the ACA DSH amendments,
see The Estimated Effect of the Affordable Care Act on Medicare and Medicaid Outlays and
Total National Health Care Expenditures: Hearing before the H. Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, 112th Cong. (2011) (testimony of Richard Foster, FSA, Chief Actuary, Ctrs. for
Medicare & Medicaid Servs.), available at http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2011/03/t201103
30e.html. For a discussion of the potential implications of the ACA DSH reductions on safety
net hospitals without concomitant amendments to strengthen DSH targeting rules, see NAT’L
ASS. OF PUB. HOSP. & HEALTH SYS., EQUITABLE, SUSTAINABLE, RELIABLE SAFETY NET FINANCING:
MEDICAID DSH 3-4 (2012), available at http://www.modernhealthcare.com/Assets/pdf/CH78
650315.PDF.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

344

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 6:329

beneficiaries receive coverage through compulsory managed care
enrollment,75 akin to enrollment in a qualified health plan in a state
Exchange. In both cases, the entities that sell these products (e.g., qualified
health plans, Medicaid managed care products) must meet certain
conditions of participation. The conditions vary, but not enormously. Indeed,
the two sets of conditions of participation parallel one another across most
areas, including marketing, access to care, network adequacy, grievance
and appeals rights, access to emergency care, independent external review,
and safety net payment requirements.76
There are differences in requirements, however, the most notable being
an insurance licensure requirement that applies only to qualified health
plans.77 In addition, qualified health plans operating in state insurance
exchanges must enter into agreements with certain “essential community
providers.”78 No similarly comprehensive provider contracting provision
applies to Medicaid managed care, but this is because, as a practical
matter, Medicaid managed care networks already are dominated by
“essential community providers” treating high volumes of low income
patients.79 Another difference between the Medicaid managed care market
and the market for qualified health plans through the Exchanges involves
accreditation: qualified health plans must be accredited,80 whereas
accreditation is not an express Medicaid managed care requirement. But
even here, the differences are not insurmountable, as of 2010, 16 state

75. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICAID MANAGED CARE ENROLLMENT REPORT
1 (2011), available at http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Top
ics/Data-and-Systems/Downloads/2011-Medicaid-MC-Enrollment-Report.pdf.
76. Compare ACA § 1311 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2011)), and ACA § 1302
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2011)) (stating standards applicable to state Exchanges and
qualified health plans), with 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2 (2010) (stating standards applicable to
Medicaid managed care plans and states that elect to furnish coverage through managed
care arrangements). For a comprehensive review of similarities and differences, see DEBORAH
BACHRACH ET AL., CTR. FOR HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES, MEDICAID MANAGED CARE: HOW STATES
EXPERIENCE CAN INFORM EXCHANGE QUALIFIED HEALTH PLAN STANDARDS (2011), available at
http://www.chcs.org/usr_doc/Medicaid_Managed_Care_and_QHP_Standards_final.pdf
(paralleling the marketing, ease of access, safety net payments, emergency care, and
grievance rights of qualified health plans and state Medicaid managed care).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 18021(a)(1)(C)(i) (2011).
78. ACA § 1311(c)(1)(C) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2011)). The term is defined to
encompass all health care entities qualified to participate in a special prescription drug
discount program authorized under the Public Health Service Act for providers furnishing a
high volume of care to low income patients.
79. See BACHRACH ET AL., supra note 76, at 4.
80. ACA § 1311(c)(1)(D) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2011)).
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Medicaid programs required accreditation, and, as noted, external review is
a feature of Medicaid managed care.81
Because the conditions of participation applicable to qualified health
plans and Medicaid managed care entities essentially cover the same policy
ground, a logical step to encourage greater alignment would be to update
the older Medicaid managed care standards (enacted in 1997) to reflect the
ACA’s newer expectations. While extending a state licensure requirement to
the Medicaid product market would be a major departure from prior
practices, states do have the power to establish specific licensure standards
for issuers of Medicaid managed care products. This would thus enable
states to accommodate community-based entities that desire to operate in
the Exchange premium subsidy market, but lack the reserves maintained by
large issuers. The licensure requirement would likely foster corporate
affiliations between these smaller community-based plans and the larger
licensed issuers so as to permit the entry of the community-based entities
into the large crossover member market as a means of maintaining
continuity of care.
Market alignment requires another step, namely addressing Medicaid’s
historically low provider payment rates (particularly for physician services) as
the cause of the dearth of healthcare providers willing to participate in the
Medicaid provider network. Although the health reform legislation contains
a temporary payment boost for Medicaid primary care services, the reform is
only two years in duration.82 One solution might be to require plans
operating in the crossover market to use Medicare payments as a floor.
Such a requirement would have the effect of raising Medicaid provider
payment rates while establishing a floor for Exchange provider payment
levels. Another approach might be the creation of financial incentives in the
form of more generous stop-loss levels for plans operating in the crossover
market that boost physician payment levels.
5. Aligning Federal Financing
The ACA attempts to resolve the age-old problem of the federal
government’s role in Medicaid financing with an approach that, charitably
put, is limited. In essence, states receive a highly enhanced federal
contribution toward the Medicaid costs associated with reform, but only for
certain populations,83 who in truth (and contrary to Chief Justice Roberts’

81. See BACHRACH ET AL., supra note 76, at 9.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(C) (2011).
83. In broad terms, states will receive 100% federal funding over the 2014-2016 time
period for medical assistance costs incurred for newly eligible populations (i.e., nonelderly
adults ineligible for Medicare and not otherwise entitled to assistance because of their
membership in one of the traditional coverage groups). Special rules apply to states that
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characterization in NFIB84) can barely be distinguished in many cases from
traditional populations. Indeed, a matter of a few dollars of monthly income
would result in the movement of millions of parents from “traditional” to
newly eligible categories. Coping with this situation will be extremely
difficult, since it will require states to track the slightest income fluctuations
of millions of low income adults, as daily work and family life change. The
clear solution is a unified, enhanced federal contribution level covering all
Medicaid populations who, depending on income, would qualify for
premium subsidies through their state Exchanges. Regardless of whether
attachment to Medicaid is based on low family income or disability, the
group to target for enhanced federal payments is individuals who, based on
income, will derive their coverage under either regime. This expanded
approach to enhanced coverage (coupled with a new state option to allow
Medicaid function as a secondary payer to Exchange coverage in the case
of persons with disabilities) would blunt the potential for elimination of
expanded Medicaid coverage for children and adults with disabilities while
simplifying the accounting requirements for calculating federal payments to
states. To be sure, this reform would require greater federal outlays on the
Medicaid side. But to the extent that moving in this direction reduces states’
incentive to eliminate coverage of all optional eligibility groups whose
incomes surpass the Exchange threshold, a greater federal contribution
could be expected to be a wash over the long term, since the Congressional
Budget Office estimates a 50% differential between Exchange and Medicaid
per capita coverage.85
III. FUTURE REFORM PROSPECTS
All legislative reform is evolutionary. The history of legislative health
policy is no different — a seminal enactment followed by a succession of

already had expanded eligibility for the newly eligible population using the Social Security
Act’s special demonstration authority. See 42 U.S.C. §1315 (2011). Beginning in 2017, this
enhanced funding will decline, ultimately remaining at 90% in 2020 and for years thereafter.
ACA § 2001 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §1395d(y) (2011)). The normal federal contribution rate
remains in place for traditional eligibility groups as well as for costs associated with plan
administration.
84. See 132 S. Ct. at 2601.
85. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE OF THE AFFORDABLE
CARE ACT, UPDATED FOR THE SUPREME COURT’S RECENT DECISION 1, 4 (2012), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43472-07-24-2012-CoverageEs
timates.pdf (showing $9000 per capita in the Exchange and $6000 per capita in Medicaid).
This difference is commonly attributable to Medicaid’s depressed provider payment rates in
relation to the private insurance market. Id. at 16. Of course, the federal government also
would lose the value of state contributions to the cost of Medicaid coverage for previously
eligible persons whose coverage was eliminated.
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amendments aimed at modifying and revising earlier policy decisions or
strengthening initial policy choices. Indeed, the ACA itself represents a series
of legislative modifications to a host of existing laws in an attempt to make
them operate in a more harmonious fashion: the Internal Revenue Code;
the Public Health Service Act; the Employee Retirement Income Security Act;
Medicare; and Medicaid. In some cases the legislative foray under the ACA
entails the addition of entirely new legislative authority to an underlying law,
as in the creation of health insurance Exchanges. More frequently, however,
the ACA alters existing provisions of law in order to promote alignment with
evolving policy choices.
Under normal circumstances, the types of reforms identified in this
article would be considered part of the standard course of lawmaking. It
took about 15 years of trying and at least four distinct sets of legislative
amendments to create a universal Medicaid entitlement for low-income
children and pregnant women, to strengthen their coverage, and to
streamline and simplify the enrollment process for these populations. It is
hardly surprising therefore, that the newest generation of Medicaid reforms
will require further refinement. Medicaid is a vast program, with total
expenditures surpassing $400 billion in FY 2010 and a projected
enrollment approaching 80 million people by 2020.86 It is one of the most
complex laws ever enacted by Congress; indeed, no less a judge than Henry
Friendly famously termed its provisions “almost unintelligible to the
uninitiated.”87 The need for further amendment and refinement thus should
hardly come as a surprise.
But, of course, this is no ordinary time for Medicaid. The fury over
Medicaid has never been higher, fueled by costs, ideology, and an
unprecedented level of political animus. Medicaid’s very legislative structure
— national policy goals achieved through federal investments that build on
and strengthen state efforts to aid the medically indigent and vulnerable —
has been thrown into uncertainty by NFIB v. Sebelius, whose undefined
reach into the future of federal spending programs is the subject of intense
scholarship.88 Despite public opinion polls underscoring its popularity with

86. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, 2010 ACTUARIAL
REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL OUTLOOK FOR MEDICAID iii-iv (2010), available at http://www.cms.
gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Research/ActuarialStudies/down
loads/MedicaidReport2010.pdf.
87. And this was more than 35 years ago, when the program was far simpler. See
Friedman v. Berger, 547 F.2d 724, 727 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976).
88. See Huberfield, supra note 3 (discussing challenges in the future of Medicaid created
by the NFIB decision); see also Bagenstos, supra note 3 (describing the uncertainties brought
by interpretations of this case’s decision).
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the American public,89 Medicaid remains exceptionally vulnerable to attack
in what is anticipated to be a seminal battle over its future and that of other
social welfare entitlements in the wake of the 2012 Presidential election.
Following the watershed election in November, three possible scenarios
await Medicaid in the 113th Congress. The first — highly unlikely — is to
make only minor structural modifications in the program while attempting to
reduce spending in the $100 billion to $200 billion range (modest in a
program projected to spend trillions in federal funds alone over the coming
decade) by simply cutting federal funding to states. This is the action
Congress took as a part of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981,
essentially applying a three percent discount to the payments they otherwise
owed state programs.90 In 1984, the 1981 payment reductions were
eliminated and federal funding was restored (indeed, in periods of
recession, federal Medicaid funding has been increased).91 States were
given certain added flexibility measures as part of the 1981 reductions, but
not such expansive powers that the basic framework of the entitlement to
coverage was structurally up-ended.
The two alternatives to the aforementioned minor surgery are far more
invasive. The first is a proposal to “block grant” Medicaid. The second is a
proposal to fundamentally alter Medicaid’s open-ended financing structure
through the use of per capita caps. In both cases, it is likely that the
“baseline” used to estimate the size of the reductions and the impact of the
savings will be Medicaid as restructured under the ACA. In other words, the
starting point will be a program that assumes elimination of Medicaid’s
historic barrier against federal funding to cover all low income people.
Whichever pathway Congress chooses however, states would be expected to
achieve the Medicaid reform goals with dramatically less federal financing.
Were Congress to choose what is popularly termed a “block grant”92
pathway, federal expenditures per state would be subject to annual

89. See, e.g., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL: MAY 2011 PUBLIC
OPINION ON HEALTH CARE ISSUES 1 (2011) (finding 60% public support for preserving Medicaid
as an entitlement program and only 13% support for major reductions). These figures are not
significantly different from public opinion regarding Medicare reforms.
90. SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1981, at 10
(Comm. Print 1981).
91. See, e.g., American Adjustment and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123
Stat. 115, 116, 489-90 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (2010)) (discussing incentives for
Medicaid in an act to stimulate economic recovery).
92. Actually the term is probably not right. In a block grant, federal payments are made in
advance of state expenditures, with limited state accountability for results. My own betting is
that federal Medicaid spending would remain an after-the-fact event, with continuing tight
federal controls over what is considered a qualifying state expenditure. This type of tight
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aggregate caps, with concomitant evisceration of federal legal requirements
in order to give states broad leeway in how they absorb the loss of funds.
The enormity of the funding loss, as well as the difficulties of apportionment
given the differences in states’ fiscal starting points under a block grant,
both have led to the repeated abandonment of the proposal.93
The latest version of this repeatedly discredited idea shows up in a 2012
proposal issued by the United States House of Representatives Budget
Committee contained in The Path to Prosperity: A Blueprint for American
Renewal.94 The proposal, virtually identical to one put forward in 2011,
proposes to repeal the ACA Medicaid expansions and to block grant the
remaining program, with growth indexed to inflation and population growth.
The Committee asserts that this approach would restore state flexibility and
autonomy while improving provider payments and consumer choice. The
proposal offers no insight as to how states and the federal government will
cope with the changes in eligibility, enrollment, benefits and coverage,
consumer protections, and administration requirements that the Committee
favors. The Committee estimates that the block grant proposal will reduce
federal Medicaid outlays by $810 billion over the FY 2013-2023 time
period, not counting the nearly $1 trillion in savings achieved by repealing
the ACA Medicaid expansion.95
Analysis suggests that the projected $810 billion in losses resulting from
placing arbitrary limits on federal Medicaid spending through a block grant
would be the least level of impact that states could anticipate.96 Were state
Medicaid costs to rise faster than the proposed growth factor, the level of
true loss relative to Medicaid’s historic open-ended financing system would
be far greater. The losses — which project to about 22% over the 2012-

control is not unexpected in a very large program and is the method used in the case of
Section 1115 demonstrations that award states flexibility.
93. See Jeanne M. Lambrew, Making Medicaid a Block Grant Program: An Analysis of the
Implications of Past Proposals, 83 MILBANK QUARTERLY 41, 46 (2005) (examining the potential
impact had block grant legislation passed by Congress but vetoed by President Clinton
succeeded). The author estimated as much as a 25% decline in federal Medicaid funding,
with highly differential impacts among the states given differences in underlying economic
conditions, health care cost factors, and other considerations. Id. at 51-52, 54.
94. PAUL RYAN, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BUDGET COMM., THE PATH TO PROSPERITY: A
BLUEPRINT FOR AMERICAN RENEWAL 14 (2012), available at http://budget.house.gov/uploaded
files/pathtoprosperity2013.pdf.
95. Id. at 42; see also Report: GOP proposals would cut $1.7T from Medicaid, THE
ADVISORY BOARD COMPANY (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.advisory.com/Daily-Briefing/2012/
10/24/GOP-proposals-would-cut-1-7-T-from-Medicaid.
96. EDWIN PARK & MATT BROADDUS, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, WHAT IF
CHAIRMAN RYAN’S MEDICAID BLOCK GRANT HAD TAKEN EFFECT IN 2001?: FEDERAL MEDICAID
FUNDS WOULD HAVE FALLEN BY 35% OR MORE IN MOST STATES, BY HALF IN SOME, BY 2010, at 1
(2012), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/4-20-12health.pdf.
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2022 time period and a 34% reduction in 2022 alone97 — would mask
much steeper proportional losses in certain states. The state programs that
risk the greatest relative losses are those that stand to gain the most
proportionately from the ACA expansions. The impact of the loss would be
greatest because these states, such as Texas, Florida, and other southern
and southwestern states have high uninsured populations and thus stand to
gain the most from coverage expansion.98 A prominent analysis released in
the fall of 2012 determined that under a plan that both repeals the
Medicaid expansion and block grants the program, enrollment would fall by
about 35 million persons by 2022.99 Furthermore, since the federal
government would presumably continue to make Medicaid payments only in
connection with approved state expenditures, the pattern of federal
disallowances and recoveries and constant state disputes that characterizes
the program today100 would be expected to persist. In other words, block
grant funds would not be free money. Indeed, if a 2012 congressional flap
over whether HHS has the legal authority to permit states to modify the rigid
work requirements of the TANF block grant program is any guide,101 tough
federal spending rules, coupled with ongoing and aggressive federal audit
practices will remain core features of any successor program. It is fair to say
that the desire of federal lawmakers to constrain federal financial support for
state programs applies regardless of whether the mechanism for a funds
transfer is open-ended or subject to limits. Indeed, were legislation limiting
97. Id. at 3.
98. See JOHN HOLAHAN ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HOUSE REPUBLICAN BUDGET PLAN:
STATE-BY-STATE IMPACT OF CHANGES IN MEDICAID FINANCING 7 (2011). For example, Florida’s
ten-year loss reached nearly 44% of what it would have received, while Vermont, a more
generous state, would experience a 26% loss below expected levels. Id. at 6 fig.3.
99. SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., COMMONWEALTH FUND, HEALTH CARE IN THE 2012 PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION: HOW THE OBAMA AND ROMNEY PLANS STACK UP 28, at Ex. 4 (2012), available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report/2012/Oct/
1636_Collins_hlt_care_2012_presidential_election_FINAL_CPI_revised_10_02_2012.pdf.
100. States have extensive appeals rights under Medicaid in furtherance of their entitlement
interest in payment. See 42 C.F.R. § 430.42 (2012) (setting forth the procedural requirements
for review of federal payment disallowances).
101. See Letter from Lynn H. Gibson, General Counsel, Gov’t Accountability Office, to
Sen. Orrin Hatch, Ranking Member, Senate Comm. on Finance, and Sen. Dave Camp,
Chairman, House of Representatives Comm. on Ways and Means 6 (Sept. 4, 2012), available
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/647778.pdf (regarding Congressional power to review the
Secretary’s decision to permit waivers of the TANF work requirements by states that seek to
establish an alternative approach to the terms of the statute). For a sense of the detailed
federal oversight procedures used to govern state and tribal TANF spending, see DEP’T HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., TRIBAL TANF AND CCDF GUIDE TO FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GRANTS
ADMINISTRATION, AND PROGRAM ACCOUNTABILITY 13-15 (2004), available at http://www.acf.
hhs.gov/sites/default/files/occ/fmgapa.pdf (explaining the types of federal payment
disallowances that can be applied to governmental TANF recipients).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2013]

MEDICAID’S NEXT FIFTY YEARS

351

federal funding also to include provisions altering state performance
requirements in the areas of eligibility, coverage, payment, and
management (and presumably this will be the case), federal oversight could
become more aggressive given the potential for looser standards to result in
less rigorous state spending management and oversight. Put another way, a
race to the bottom does not make the green eyeshades irrelevant.
Furthermore, Medicaid is heavily embedded in state economies as a
result of the complex financing arrangements on which the program rests (a
combination of general revenues, special taxes, and transfers among units
of governments that share responsibility for the operation of public
healthcare systems serving Medicaid beneficiaries along with other low
income populations).102 As a result, a block grant promises to set in motion
a great economic unraveling as the losses spread through local public
health economies, rolling over public healthcare institutions, school health
systems, public health clinics, and public, community-based programs for
persons with disabilities. This, of course, is where the strong public response
to Medicaid is so telling: for millions of families, Medicaid is an essential
part of the fabric of daily life.
In view of the enormous consequences flowing from a block grant, the
more plausible option, and one being discussed with increasing intensity, is
what is known as a “per capita cap.” Under this approach, the federal
government would cease to contribute a share of a state’s total program
spending.103 Instead, the federal contribution would look more like a
defined per capita contribution up to a fixed dollar amount per beneficiary
served. While this approach does not so dramatically leave states strapped
of resources to provide care for the tens of millions of low income Medicaid
beneficiaries and to support the providers that serve those beneficiaries, it
nonetheless raises numerous problems of its own.
The first is the difficulty of fashioning a defined contribution
methodology that properly accounts for health risks given states’ limited
coverage experience with low income adults who are not parents of minor
children. Many newly eligible persons will be healthy adults, but others will
have extensive physical and mental health problems. The lack of cost
experience, coupled with the general confusion regarding how to absorb the
losses associated with a per capita cap, can be expected to dampen most
states’ interest in Medicaid expansion, even if expansion with federal funding
remains an option.

102. For a review of federal/state financial relationships and their effect on local health
economies, see MACPAC, supra note 74, ch. 3.
103. EDWIN PARK & MATT BROADDUS, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, MEDICAID PER
CAPITA CAP WOULD SHIFT COSTS TO STATES AND PLACE LOW INCOME BENEFICIARIES AT RISK 1
(2012), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/10-4-12health.pdf.
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A second problem with a defined contribution model is the weakness of
the methodology in relation to the actual cost of care. A pandemic, an
unanticipated public health crisis such as the HIV/AIDS epidemic that swept
the nation in the 1980s, a major natural or manmade disaster such as
Hurricane Katrina or the World Trade Center attack, all can throw off
actuarial projections that reflect normal conditions, as can major technology
breakthroughs that create game-changing conditions for the healthcare
system (for example, national spending on prescription drugs grew by 15%
in 1998 alone).104 However, policymakers could fortify the defined
contribution model with proper provisions to account for such anomalies.
A third problem is that a per capita cap essentially takes a snapshot of
state Medicaid spending as it exists at a specified moment in time (i.e., the
baseline). Thus, states that have low per capita spending, either because of
low pricing, limited coverage, or both, are in essence locked into artificially
depressed caps. States that did not previously cover certain disabled
populations but desire to add coverage would have no financial history
against which the cap could be measured and so would be exposed to
whatever unsupported methodology is proposed. States that experience
large annual leaps in per beneficiary costs would have no means of
recouping their losses, since the cap would be set to grow at a fixed rate
(e.g., inflation plus one percent). And of course, quite problematically, once
set, the cap could be lowered in the face of budgetary or other constraints.
Moreover, in exchange for absorbing the impact of a per capita cap, states
would demand far more flexibility in Medicaid than they now enjoy: over
eligibility, enrollment, coverage, benefits, payments, and management
requirements and safeguards.
The final problem is the reality of Medicaid spending. The great driver of
Medicaid spending today is enrollment. Pricing, which is quite depressed,
and per capita costs, which are state-controlled through outlays and
utilization, particularly in the case of costly populations, do not factor in as
much. Indeed, so tightly managed are Medicaid expenditures that per
enrollee growth rates for the coming decade are expected to be at GDP.105
Viewed through this lens, it becomes evident that a per capita cap
essentially saves nothing unless it is held below even the rate of GDP
growth. Thus, while it certainly would be possible to embed a number of the
reforms outlined in this article into a per capita cap approach to federal
Medicaid spending, it is also true that states’ interest in improving its
performance might be distinctly dampened by their need to contain costs
below even minimal rates of inflation.
104. Id. at 6.
105. John Holahan & Stacey Morrow, Medicare and Medicaid Spending Trends and the
Deficit Debate, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 393, 394 (2012).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The ACA made seminal Medicaid reforms while triggering a need for
further alignment. As the Act has moved toward implementation, the need
for additional reform has become clearer, an inevitability in any remarkably
complex piece of legislation. Whether Medicaid’s next 50 years will witness
its ongoing transformation, through continued federal investment, into an
effective component of a comprehensive scheme of universal coverage or
instead, its decline ultimately will be an intensely political determination
rather than one driven by health policy. The policy argument pleads for
continued strengthening; but the enduringly ferocious politics of Medicaid
may be moving the program along a far different pathway.
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